The global financial meltdown brought to light a number of weaknesses in the U.S. financial system. Not all financial institution types will be taking large sums of taxpayer money to address their crippling decisions. Credit unions in the U.S. represent a type of financial cooperative that will probably not take any taxpayer money directly due to their structure and prudential oversight. Commercial banks, especially the megabanks, are likely to see even more bailouts in the future unless structural weaknesses are addressed in the clarifications as part of the enforcement of the Dodd--Frank Act. Using a unique panel data set on U.S. commercial banks, thrifts and credit unions from 1994 through 2010 (over 300,000 observations) performance metrics on a number of dimensions point to strengths and weaknesses of the various financial institutional forms. Credit unions also have had far fewer adjustable rate mortgages and mortgage backed securities as a percent of their portfolio. Robust estimators to correct for potential endogeneity are used to analyze the ROA differentials between different institutional forms and portfolios. When controlling for size, region and portfolios credit unions are often estimated to have a better ROA. Institutions of under 50 million dollars, about 50 percent of the total sample, show credit unions having higher efficiency in that they control more assets per dollar spent on salaries than commercial and savings banks. 1 Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: P0, P13, L21, G14, G21 Keywords: credit unions, banks, cooperative, defaults, net charge-offs, return on assets 1 Thanks to the participants of the International Economics Association, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, July 2011 and to the referees for insightful comments and suggestions.
I. Introduction
The "Great Recession" has brought tremendous hardship to many across the globe. The finger pointing for who was at fault has not often strayed far from the financial sector and in particular the focus has often been on bank lending and regulatory oversight. What has often been missed in this focus has been the relative strength of the U.S.'s cooperative financial sector, the credit unions. Credit unions in the U.S. will ultimately probably not take a penny from the U.S. taxpayer in the form of a bailout for this crisis, while at the same time the amount given to commercial banks either directly or indirectly by a number of observers is well into trillions of dollars (e.g., Blinder and Zandi 2010 and the Congressional Oversight Panel 2010 . This paper will look at the U.S. financial sector and try to detect what early signals can be discerned that may help prevent a repeat of the current tragic contraction of world GDP and help develop prudential lending and regulatory practices by comparing the path various financial intermediaries have followed.
Using a data set on all commercial banks, savings banks and credit unions in the United States for the last 17 years allows for comparisons between types of intermediaries that permits for controls for a number of different settings. This data set is quite unusual in its breadth and depth and makes possible an assessment of conditions precipitating the financial collapse across financial forms.
The regulatory environment is likely to change with the advent of the Dodd--Frank legislation in the U.S. and globally as well due to stiffer capital requirements in the Basel Accords (Stefan Walter, 2010) . Although there is likely to be changes in the regulatory environment for all financial institutions, a number of the changes come about from a lack of appropriate oversight of proper lending safeguards, capital adequacy and firm governance. Christian helped start the campaign over her irritation with poor customer service and high fees (Gelles, 2011 and Dan Beucke, 2011) . This on--going movement towards credit unions and community banks brought a number of new accounts into credit unions. This movement away from institutions that are seen as too big to care for their customers, especially those with smaller accounts is a recurrent theme in the growth of credit unions. Alphonse Desjardins of Quebec Canada, inspired by the earlier efforts of Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch in Germany in the 1840's, helped found the first credit union in the United States in 1909 (McLanahan and McLanahan, 1990) . Later efforts by Pierre Jay and Edward Filene of Boston helped grow the credit union movement so that by 1970 there were over 23,000 credit unions in the U.S. (Klinedinst and Rock, 1993) . The "Self Help Credit Union" of North Carolina carries on the tradition of not only offering services to those who are typically relatively neglected in the banking industry, but also has been active in supporting other cooperative firms and small businesses (Self Help, 2012) .
Commercial banks and savings banks 3 in the United States may be publicly traded joint stock companies and usually, especially commercial banks, have more diverse portfolios than credit unions and are regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Office of Thrift Supervision. To the average consumer sometimes the difference between these institutions is not apparent, but clearly the financial performance during this crisis and earlier crises often offer stark comparisons.
The next section will discuss the theory on different financial institutions and performance. The third section will examine the data used here and the empirical approach. The final two parts of the paper will focus on the empirical results and the policy implications that follow. 3 Savings banks and savings associations are grouped together here.
II. Theory
Credit unions and banks have a long history in the U.S. Although they generally fill a different niche in the market, they compete in some cases quite fiercely. Credit unions as financial cooperatives, based on the principle of one person--one vote, are non--profit institutions. Hence when comparing banks and credit unions a major question to be dealt with is what is the appropriate metric across such dissimilar institutions. Reporting to stockholders who want a good return on investments, managers would be keen to follow the return on assets (ROA). Credit unions, however, may be modeled as maximizing their shareholders income, quite a different maximand since for example the return retained by the credit union may make the income from deposits smaller for the shareholder (Bauer, 2010 and Sollenberger, 2008) . Efficiency measures may sometimes work across institutions, but still typically suffer from the same confounding problems as the return on assets criterion. The ability to survive adverse conditions, contributions to the community (or minus in the case of bailouts), assets per employee or assets per dollar spent on salaries are all commonly used metrics.
Credit unions are typically much smaller than banks, hence their role as a small town lender is often similar to small banks. Like small banks in rural areas they play a key role in economic development by allowing small businesses the cash needed to get started or to continue to operate. This help to businesses is often indirect in the form of loans to an individual for home equity or personal loans (credit unions are proscribed by law to limit their business lending to 12.25 percent of assets 4 ). In the U.S. then the credit union often plays the role of the Grameen bank by helping out small businesses. Certainly a useful metric then would be how many sucessful businesses started out with a loan from a credit union, savings bank or commercial bank, but alas this data is not readily available. Another metric that could be explored is the development of social capital (Aoki, 2010 and Klinedinst, 2007) . How much trust does a customer feel towards their intermediary may be a useful metric if this could be measured. Does this trusting relationship depend on customer relations' strategies that may for example, at least temporarily, cause more employees to be added and then hurt the "bottom line?"
III. Data and Methodology
The data set covers all credit unions and banks in the United States from 1994 until December 2010, available from the FDIC and the National Credit Union Association (NCUA). Altogether there are 331,289 observations over the seventeen-year period.
Determining credit union and bank performance could be done, as mentioned already, by looking at returns on assets, net charge-offs, asset growth, number of failures, variants of the value-added approach or assets per employee.
5
Generally the functional forms estimated can be posited as: 4 Credit unions are actively trying to increase this limit to 27.5 percent of assets arguing that this would create thousands of jobs and help diversify portfolios. 5 See for example, Sollenberger (2008) , Greer and Rhoades (1977) , Lieberman and Asaba (1997) , Berger and Humphrey (1992) , Goddard J., McKillop D. and Wilson J. (2008) , and Park and Weber (2006) .
The performance indicator, Y it , used here is return on assets. 
Here X it is assumed to be exogenous and Z it contains elements that may be endogenous.
Using a generalized instrumental variable estimator on this equation gives statistics that are asymptotically valid. This method allows estimation of the primary variable examined here, the time invariant dummies for whether the institution is a credit union, savings 6 White (1980) . bank or a commercial bank. 7 To allow a degree of robustness to the results and mimic to some extent the wide range of estimators in the literature a number of specifications are used such as measuring the variables in levels or in logarithms, fixed effects, etc.
IV. Results
Credit unions are the most numerous financial intermediary in the U.S. as can be seen in Table 1 Table 1 is net charge--offs, uncollectable obligations minus that recovered. The average is about 55 basis points with commercial banks having the highest average of about 61 basis points.
Given that there may be large differences in salaries the assets per dollar spent on salaries is also calculated in Table 2 . The overall average is approximately 75$, with both credit unions and commercial banks below the average. It is important to note that salaries sometimes make up a small percent of executive compensation at larger institutions since incentive payments in the form of bonuses, options, deferred compensation, etc. may approach 100 percent. 8 Hence consideration of just salaries would mean that the assets to salary figures stated here would be substantially overstated for large institutions. To mitigate the impact that the approximately 90,000 volunteers contribute to the bottom line for credit unions the observations with zero compensation were not used (CUNA, 2012) . To get around this problem and to make a comparison among similar sized institutions, the figures for "assets per dollar of salary" were also computed for all institutions with assets more than a billion dollars and also those under 50 million. In both divisions credit unions out perform commercial banks, which are below the average in each sub sample. In the case of the smaller institutions, where about 50 percent of the credit unions observations are, credit unions out performed both commercial and savings banks. These results in favor of the credit unions may be just "the tip of the iceberg" if all compensation and executive perks were available.
The regression results presented in Tables 3a--c and Table 4 generally increase in complexity in this unbalanced panel data set with 27,346 firms. Random effects models are in column three of Tables 3a--c, with Table 3b and Table 3c including time, regional and state dummies as well, all trying to capture unobservable differences due to managerial ability, technology, etc. The additional controls proved to be significant, 9 but this effort to show robustness through a number of functional forms is also sometimes plagued with multicollinearity which weakens the parameter estimates. A dummy for institutions with assets over $50 billion, "too big to fail," is included to try and capture any effects that come from such a large size and that may cause systemic risk. The Hausman--Taylor model used in Table 4 takes into account the potential presence of endogeneity, which the Durbin--Wu--Hausman test showed to be present, hence Table 4 will be the main focus of the discussion on 9 F statistic of 242.58 with 66 degrees of freedom and a p value of 0.00.
the econometric results. 10 Table 3a starts the series by using the variables measured in raw levels and no controls for time, region and state. The OLS and random effects estimates show that credit unions and commercial banks, when controlling for large size, employees, and portfolio selection have a significantly better return on assets performance relative to savings banks. This performance edge holds up through all through Table 3 . The "too big to fail" dummy was not always estimated with significance, but when it was in the Table 3 Assets per dollar of salary was not often measured with accuracy, the strongest measurement in Table 3c is positive as might be expected. Loans to insiders in the Table 3 series was consistently shown to have a negative impact when significant.
The portfolio variables in the Table 3 series were often estimated with precision as might be expected, but since the presence of endogeniety is indicated these estimates will be discussed in detail with Table 4 . Typically the logarithmic estimators give more precise parameter estimates than do the specifications using levels of the raw data. Except for column 4 of Table 4 where the commercial bank dummy is positive and significant, the credit unions are predicted to have better ROA when all else is equal. The "too big to fail" dummy is not significant across the table. Similar to the Table 3 results, the number of employees when significant is positive. The efficiency measure of assets per dollar of salary is also positive when measured precisely. Loans to insiders, a way to possibly measure hidden compensation here, unlike in the earlier estimates, is positive when significant. Credit card loans and net charge--offs are all measured to have a negative and significant impact on ROA. The other portfolio measures are typically estimated to be positive, except for commercial loans.
V. Policy Implications

Credit unions although the most numerous financial intermediary in the United
States have an important role to play in that their failure rates are much less than other financial institutions. The small size of the institution may be an important factor in developing strong ties to customers that lead not only to trust and loyalty, but also to engendering pertinent information to offer loans and other services that are prudentially sound. Finding a good metric to measure performance across institution types is a difficult problem that offers no easy solution. For example, return on assets (ROA) is commonly used in many industries, but for associations and financial cooperatives this is not commonly seen to be the organizations primary objective. Efficiency measures are also problematic in many cases for spanning institutional forms since what may be efficient in one setting may be counter productive in another. Acknowledging the caveats about using the ROA nevertheless that is the main metric used here to compare the performance of credit unions, savings banks and commercial banks. As would be expected the average ROA at commercial banks is higher than found at credit unions and savings banks. 
